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Alday,	Schlesewsky	&	Bornkessel-Schlesewsky	(ASB)	[1]	provide	a	stimulating	commentary	on	
the	issues	discussed	in	our	paper	[2],	highlighting	important	connections	between	sampling,	
Bayesian	inference,	neural	networks,	free	energy	and	basins	of	attraction.	Here,	we	trace	some	
relevant	history	of	computational	theories	of	the	brain.		
	
Consider	the	Hopfield	network	[3],	a	“neural	network,”	with	symmetrical	connections	between	
binary	neural	“units.”	Hopfield	showed	how	such	a	network	could	learn:	patterns	were	
“imposed”	on	the	network,	and	connections	modified	by	local	Hebbian	learning.	Remarkably,	
the	network	could	“fill	in”	patterns	from	fragments,	providing	a	form	of	“content-addressable	
memory.”	Hopfield	showed,	too,	that	the	‘free-running’	of	such	a	network	minimized	an	“energy	
function”	across	the	entire	network,	measuring	the	coherence	of	the	pattern	with	respect	to	the	
connection	weights	(roughly,	coherence	involves	positive	weights	between	units	with	the	same	
value;	negative	weights	between	units	with	different	values).	The	behavior	of	the	network	as	it	
falls	into	a	stable	pattern	can	be	viewed	as	falling	into	an	attractor	basin---just	as	the	dynamics	
of	many	physical	systems	can	be	modelled	as	descending	in	an	energy	landscape.		
	
The	Boltzmann	machine	[4],	mentioned	by	ASB,	extends	the	Hopfield	model	in	a	variety	of	ways.	
Crucially,	it	can	learn	from	patterns	presented	on	subsets	of	“visible”	units,	employing	freely-
varying	“hidden”	units	which	allow	more	complex	relationships	between	the	visible	units	to	be	
expressed.	As	before,	the	binary	states	of	the	“neural”	units	in	the	Boltzmann	machine	can	be	
assigned	an	energy	function;	but	in	the	Boltzmann	machine,	the	units	are	stochastic.	Thus,	the	
network	“settles”	not	into	a	fixed	pattern,	but	rather	into	a	probability	distribution	across	
patterns.	Each	“update”	of	a	new	unit	corresponds	to	a	drawing	a	new	sample	from	the	
probability	distribution,	using	the	technique	of	Gibbs	sampling	[5],	first	developed	in	computer	
vision,	and	now	widely	used	in	statistics	and	machine	learning.	Moreover,	the	Boltzmann	
machine	can	be	trained	to	model	a	probability	distribution	presented	over	the	visible	units	via	
Hebbian	learning	during	a	“wake”	phase,	and	anti-Hebbian	learning	during	a	“sleep”	phase,	
where	no	input	is	presented,	and	the	system	runs	freely.		
	
This	exciting	constellation	of	ideas	illustrates	that	a	system	of	interconnected	neuron-like	units	
can	learn	to	sample	from	a	complex	probability	distribution	from	experience;	and,	indeed,	
sample	from	conditional	distributions	where	some	of	the	visible	units	are	“clamped”---
corresponding	to	Bayesian	conditionalization.	A	learning	rule	carries	out	gradient	ascent	in	the	
“likelihood”	of	the	data	presented	at	the	visible	units.	All	of	this	is	achieved	with	no	explicit	
representation	of	probability,	but	merely	simple,	distributed	“neural”	computations.		
	
The	Boltzmann	machine	does	not	scale-up	well.	But	related	ideas	have	evolved	in	a	variety	of	
directions.	One	approach	focusses	on	representing	complex	probability	distributions	through	
sparse	and	structured	“graphical	models”	which	implicitly	capture	dependencies	between	
variables	(e.g.,	[6]).	Indeed,	general	purpose	programming	languages	for	compositionally	
specifying	and	sampling	from	arbitrary	probability	distributions	have	been	created	(e.g.,	[7]).		
	
A	different	development	de-emphasizes	compositional	representation,	and	focusses	on	
learning,	typically	with	richly	connected	networks	without	a	transparent	interpretation.	For	
example,	“restricted”	Boltzmann	machines	can	be	“stacked”	into	multiple	layers	(e.g.,	in	deep	
belief	networks;	[8]).	More	broadly,	deep	learning	has	scaled	up	to	achieve	state-of-the-art	
machine	learning	performance	[9].	
	
More	neurobiologically	realistic	implementations	of	sampling	algorithms	have	recently	been	
developed,	some	of	which	implement	sampling	for	discrete	variables	on	networks	of	spiking	
neurons	(e.g.,	[10]).	Other	schemes	for	sampling	continuous	variables	build	on	the	link	between	
energy	and	probability,	producing	dynamics	in	networks	of	excitatory	and	inhibitory	neurons	
that	implement	an	advanced	sampling	algorithm	(e.g.,	[11]).	
In	contrast	to	our	sampling	proposal,	Friston’s	(e.g.,	[12])	free	energy	approach	does	not	treat	
the	entire	state	of	the	brain	as	a	single	sample	from	a	posterior	probability	distribution.	The	free	
energy	approach	also	does	not	implicitly	represent	the	probability	of	every	possible	hypothesis	–	
far	from	it.	The	true	posterior	distribution	is	approximated	by	a	simpler	distribution,	and	
minimizing	free	energy	brings	this	simpler	distribution	into	approximate	correspondence	with	
the	true	posterior.	In	Friston’s	model,	neurons	encode	the	parameters	of	this	approximating	
distribution	(cf.	[13]),	often	a	simple	Gaussian	distribution,	which	yields	an	elegant	
neurobiological	implementation	of	the	free	energy	approach.		
We	argued	[2]	that	sampling	will	produce	reasoning	errors	such	as	the	unpacking	effect	and	the	
conjunction	fallacy	if	the	sampler	only	samples	a	single	mode	in	a	multimodal	distribution.	
Perhaps	approximating	a	multimodal	posterior	distribution	with	a	single	(e.g.,	Gaussian)	mode	
may	be	a	different	route	to	producing	these	same	errors.	Thus	these	various	approximations	to	
Bayesian	inference	may	provide	competing	explanations	of	observed	fallacies	and	biases	
observed	in	explicit	reasoning	with	probabilities.	
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